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Introduction
The New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) adds nominal inertia to the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. 1 NNS models are characterized by monopolistic competition, some form of wage and/or price stickiness, and demand determination of output and employment. The NNS was quickly adopted as a framework for the evaluation of monetary policy, and a large literature has ensued. 2 Hanging over this literature, however, is Lucas' (2003) claim that macroeconomic stabilization is no longer an important concern: "Taking U.S. performance over the past 50 years as a benchmark, the potential for welfare gains from better long-run, supply side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in short-run demand management. (page 1)"
Calibrating an ingeniously simple model to the U.S. data, Lucas argued that households would only be willing to give up one twentieth of one percent of consumption to be free of fluctuations in consumption about its trend, no matter how the fluctuations were generated.
In this paper, we calculate the welfare cost of nominal inertia in an NNS model with wage and price stickiness, capital formation, and empirically estimated rules for the cental bank's interest rate policy and government spending. We calibrate our model to fit U.S. quarterly data, and we show that our model captures many aspects of the U.S. business cycle quite well. Moreover, we show that our model is capable of generating most of the volatility observed in certain efficiency gaps that have been emphasized by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and (especially) Gali, -2-Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) .
The bottom line is that our NNS model implies welfare costs for nominal inertia that are twenty to sixty times larger than what Lucas found: the "average" household in our model would be willing to give up one to three percent of consumption to be free of the effects of wage and price stickiness. We also find that wage stickiness is the primary source of this welfare cost. It should be noted, however, that we make no attempt to identify optimal monetary and fiscal policies, or to calculate the welfare gain that might come from them. Thus, we do not directly address Lucas' basic claim (that there is little room for further improvement in short-run demand management).
Two issues are worth mention before going on. The first is that firms and workers probably derive some benefit from nominal inertia. Why else would they engage in it? Our model does not address the factors that give rise to nominal inertia, and it may therefore overstate the benefits to eliminating it. The second issue -which may well be related to the first -is that our model assumes wage stickiness matters. Goodfriend and King (2001) question the relevance of observed wage inertia on theoretical grounds: "... there is a fundamental asymmetry between product and labor markets. The labor market is characterized by long term relationships where there is opportunity for firms and workers to neutralize the allocative effects of temporarily sticky nominal wages. ...
(However), spot transactions predominate in product markets where there is much less opportunity for the effects of sticky nominal prices to be privately neutralized." On the other hand, a growing empirical literature suggests that wage inertia helps NNS models explain the U.S. data : Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) found that wage stickiness helps explain persistence in the effects of monetary shocks, and Smets and Wouters (2003) showed that wage stickiness also helps explain other features of the data.
-3-3 Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) employ the Linear-Quadratic approach pioneered by Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford; see Woodford (2003) .
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe our NNS model. Calvo-style wage and price contracts create inefficiencies that interact with inefficiencies due to monopolistic competition to produce what we call the welfare cost of nominal inertia. In Section 3, we discuss the implications of our model. We explain how we calibrated and simulated the model, and we demonstrate how the model is capable of replicating some of the basic features of the U.S. business cycle. We derive a welfare measure that is closely related to Lucas', and we calculate the welfare cost of various types of nominal inertia. We also identify some weakness in our modeling of fiscal policy generally, and government spending in particular. In Section 4, we summarize our conclusions and discuss directions for future work.
An NNS Model with Price and Wage Inertia and Capital Formation
Like other NNS models, our model is characterized by optimizing agents, monopolistic competition, and nominal inertial. It is most closely related to the models of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Collard and Dellas (2003) : as in Collard and Dellas (2003) , we allow for capital accumulation, and we calculate second order approximations to both the model and the welfare function; and as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) , we allow for both wage and price inertia. Staggered price setting leads to a dispersion in the firms' prices that creates an inefficiency in household consumption decisions, and staggered wage setting leads to a dispersion in the households' wages that creates an inefficiency in firm hiring decisions. Our purpose here is to get an idea of the magnitude of these inefficiencies in NNS models.
-4-4 For a fuller discussion of this, and equations (5) and (6) that follow, see Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2003) .
Firms' price setting behavior -
There is a continuum of firms indexed by f on the unit interval. Each firm rents capital K t-1 (f) at the rate R t , hires a labor bundle N t (f) (to be defined below) at the rate W t (also defined below), and produces a differentiated product using the Cobb-Douglass technology
where 0 < < < 1, and Z t is an economy wide productivity shock. Z t follows a simple auto regressive process -log(Z t ) = Dlog(Z t-1 ) + , p,t ; our estimation of this process is described in Appendix B. The firm's cost minimization problem implies
and the firm's marginal cost can be expressed as (see Appendix A)
The modeling of monopolistic competition is now standard in the NNS literature. The first step is to derive a demand curve for each firm's product. Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) , we assume the artifice of a competitive 'bundler': the bundler acquires the firms' products Y t (f), paying the prices P t (f), and assembles a composite product
which the bundler then sells to households and the government, as either a consumption good or capital. The constant elasticity aggregator, (4), reflects household and government preferences; so, the bundler chooses the same combination of firms' products that the households' and the government would, and the bundler's demand for the output of firm f is equal to total demand. 4 Cost -5- 5 We set steady state inflation equal to zero. But, our results would be the same if we let the contract price rise with a non-zero steady state rate of inflation; see EHL (2000) . minimi-zation (and the zero profit condition) implies that the bundler's price is
and the bundler's demand for the product of firm f is
The bundler's price, P t , can be interpreted as the aggregate price level.
Following Calvo (1983) , firms set prices in staggered 'contracts' of random duration. In any period t, each firm gets to announce a new price with probability (1-"); otherwise, the old contract, and its price, remains in effect. 5 With this scheme, the average duration of a price contract is (1-")
periods (quarters, in what follows).
If firm f gets to announce a new contract in period t, it chooses a new price P t * (f) to maximize the value of its profit stream over states of nature in which the new price is expected to hold:
where TC(f) is the firm's total cost, $ is the households' discount factor, and 8 j is the households' marginal utility of nominal wealth (to be defined below). The firm's first order condition is
where : p = N p /(N p -1) is a monopoly markup factor, and
As " 6 0, all firms reset their prices each period (the flexible price case), and P t * (f) 6 : p MC t (f).
Since the markup is positive (: p > 1), output will be inefficiently low in the flexible price solution.
-6- 6 The utility function (and budget constraint below) should also include a term in real money balances, but we follow much of the NNS literature in assuming that this term is negligible. Since we specify an interest rate rule for monetary policy, there is no real need to model money explicitly.
Households' wage setting behavior and capital accumulation -
There is a continuum of households indexed by h on the unit interval. Each household supplies a differentiated labor service to all of the firms in the economy. Once again, we assume the artifice of a competitive bundler: the bundler acquires the households' labor services L t (h), paying the wages W t (h), and assembles a composite labor service
which the bundler then supplies to firms at the wage rate W t . The constant elasticity aggregator, and the bundler's demand for the labor of household h is
The utility of household h is
where C t (h) is the household's consumption of Y t , and the second term on the RHS reflects the disutility of work. 6 2 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Lucas (2003) focused much of his attention on this parameter, arguing that the welfare cost of fluctuations in consumption are negli--7-7 B t+1 (h) is the number of (period t+1) dollar claims in the portfolio, contingent on a given state's occurring; ) t,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor (the price of a dollar claim divided by the probability of the state); and E t is an expectation over all the states of nature. For a concise discussion of state contingent claims, see Chapter 3 of Cochrane (2001) . gible unless 2 is incredibly high. We will restrict ourselves to log utility (2 = 1), and focus attention on P, which will be an important parameter in determining the welfare costs of nominal inertia.
The budget constraint of household h is
where the first term on the LHS is a portfolio of contingent claims; I t is the household's investment in capital, T t is a lump sum tax (used by the government to balance its budget constraint each period), and the last three terms on the RHS are the household's wage, rental and dividend income. The household's capital accumulation is governed by
where * is the depreciation rate, and the last term is the cost of adjusting the capital stock.
Household h maximizes utility, (14), subject to its budget constraint, (15), its labor demand curve, (13), and its capital accumulation constraint, (16). We begin with the wage setting decision.
Following Calvo (1983) , households set wages in staggered 'contracts' of random duration. In any period t, each household gets to announce a new wage with probability (1-T); otherwise, the old contract, and its wage, remains in effect. The average duration of a wage contract is (1-T) -1 periods.
If household h gets to announce a new contract in period t, it chooses the new wage
where : w = N w /(N w -1) is a monopoly markup factor, and
-8- 8 The FOC for B t+1 (h) is: ) t,t+1 = 8 t+1 (h)/8 t (h), where 8 t (h) is the marginal utility of wealth. All households face the same discount factor, ) t,t+1 ; so, if all households have the same initial wealth, 8 t (h) = 8 t for all h. First order conditions for C t (h), I t (h) and K t (h) are identical for all h.
where 8 j is the household's marginal utility of nominal wealth (to be defined below). As T 6 0, all house-holds get to reset their wages each period (the flexible wage case), and W t * (h) = : w N t P /8 t ; that is, the wage is a markup over the (dollar value of the) marginal disutility of work. Since the markup is positive (: w > 1), the labor supplied will be inefficiently low in the flexible wage solution. Note that 1/P is the Frisch (or constant 8 t ) elasticity of labor supply; this parameter will play a prominent role in the next section.
When wages are sticky (T > 0), wage rates will generally differ across households, and firms will demand more labor from households charging lower wages. Our model is inherently one of heterogeneous agents, but our assumption of complete contingent claims markets makes households identical in terms of their consumption and investment decisions. 8 In equilibrium, aggregate consumption will be equal each household's consumption and to per capita consumption -C t = I 1 0 C t (h)dh = C t (h)I 1 0 dh = C t (h) -and the same is true of the aggregate capital stock -
. So, we can write the equilibrium versions of the households' first order conditions for consumption and investment in terms of aggregate values:
where 8 t and > t are the Lagrangian multipliers for the households' budget and capital accumulation -9-9 Consider a bond that costs 1 dollar in period t and pays 1+i t dollars in all states of nature in period t+1. 1 = E t [) t,t+1 (1+i t )] (see Chapter 3 of Cochrane (2001)); so, 1/(1+i t )= E t [) t,t+1 ]. 10 The ugliness of the Calvo scheme is that there is some probability that any given wage (or price) contract may last for a very long period of time.
constraints, and i t is the return on a 'risk free' bond. 
The aggregate price and wage levels, aggregate employment and aggregate output -
The aggregate price level can be written as
since the law of large numbers implies that (1-")" j is the fraction of firms that set their prices t-j periods ago, and have not gotten to reset them since. It is straightforward to show that
Similarly, the aggregate wage (defined by equation (12) can be written as
These calculations illustrate the beauty of the Calvo scheme for wage and price setting. 10 It allows us to convert the aggregate wage and price levels -complicated integrals over households and firms -into infinite sums, which can then be converted into non-linear difference equations that the computer can solve. This trick will be used below to calculate various wage, price and employment dispersion terms.
In Appendix A, we show that aggregate output can be written as
where N t = I 1 0 N t (f)df is aggregate employment, K t-1 = I 1 0 K t-1 (h)dh is the aggregate capital stock, and
Np df is a measure of the price dispersion across firms; DP t can be written as (28) DP t = (1-")(P t /P t * (f)) Np + "(P t /P t-1 ) Np DP t-1 .
-10-11 Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show that, to a first order of approximation, the difference between our aggregators and a simple linear sum is just a constant. Therefore, the distinction does not matter for the standard deviations we calculate below.
It should be noted that N t (f) is the firm's demand for a composite labor service (defined by the aggregator (11)). So, our definition of aggregate employment -N t = I 1 0 N t (f)df -is not the simple sum of individual household's work efforts. Similarly, our definition of aggregate output Y t (defined in equation (4)) is not the simple sum of firm's outputs, and our aggregate price level P t (equation (5)) does not correspond exactly to measured CPI. Nevertheless, in the empirical work that follows, we will identify N t , Y t and P t with the aggregate employment, output and price levels in the data.
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The inefficiency due to price dispersion can be seen in equation (27). Each firm has the same marginal cost (equation (3)); so, consumers should choose equal amounts of the firms' products to maximize the consumption good aggregator (4). If prices are flexible (" = 0), then P t (f) = P t for all f, and this efficiency condition will be met; if prices are sticky (" > 0), then product prices will differ, and consumption decisions will be distorted. This distortion is manifested in equation (27) . If prices are flexible, DP t = 1 and aggregate output is maximized for a given labor input; if prices are sticky, DP t > 1 and output will be less for a given labor input.
Monetary and fiscal policy -
Monetary policy and government spending are given empirical specifications; we make no claim that these policies are optimal in any normative sense. We use a standard interest rate rule to describe interest rate policy:
(29) i t = 0.222 + 0.824i t-1 + 0.35552B t + 0.032384(output gap) t + , i,t , where B t = log(P t /P t-1 ) and the standard error of the interest rate shock, , i,t , is .00245. We estimated this rule over the Volcker and Greenspan years (1979.3 -2003 .2); see Appendix B. We use an auto -11-regressive process for government spending:
where the intercept term, ., is chosen to make G/Y = 0.20 in the steady state, and the standard error of the fiscal shock, , g,t , is about 0.01; see Appendix B.
Welfare -
Our measure of welfare is
where C t (= I 
h. In this special case, households are identical, and our measure of welfare, U t , reduces to individual household utility U t (h) (defined by equation (14)).
If wages are sticky (T > 0), then there is a dispersion of wages that makes firms hire different amounts of work from each household. This creates an inefficiency similar to the inefficiency due to price dispersion: the composite labor service used by firms -N t = I 
The Model's Implications
In this section, we show that our model can be calibrated to capture some of the basic features of the U.S. business cycle; we also identify some of the ways our model falls short. In earlier work, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) Levin (2000) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) . Once this is established, we use the model to measure the welfare cost of various kinds of nominal inertia. Finally, we discuss some of the ways in which our model may be deficient, and how these deficiencies may affect our welfare calculations. Table 1 specifies the parameters we use in our benchmark calibration. In Appendix B, we discuss our choice of parameter values, our estimation of the interest rate rule and the stochastic processes for productivity and government spending, and our data. Here, we focus attention on just -13-12 See Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2003) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) for a discussion of these studies. 13 This data period corresponds to one for our estimated interest rate rule. The two data periods produced very similar estimates for the government spending process; see Appendix B.
Matching Model Moments with Moments in the Quarterly U.S. data -
three parameters: 1/P, the Frisch (or constant 8 t ) elasticity of labor supply; D, the autoregressive parameter in the stochastic process for productivity; and F, the standard deviation of the innovation in the productivity process.
The Frisch elasticity will be important in our welfare analysis: low values of 1/P imply high costs of nominal inertia. Empirical estimates of the Frisch elasticity range from 0.05 to 0.35.
12 So, our benchmark specification -1/P = 0.33 -is quite conservative for the purposes of our welfare
analysis. In what follows, we will consider a range of values for 1/P -0.14, 0.20, 0.33 and 1.00 -corresponding to P = 7, 5, 3 and 1; all are conservative in the sense that they in the upper half of the estimated range and beyond.
The persistence and volatility of productivity shocks will also be important in our welfare Table 2 compares results from our calibrated model with quarterly data from the U.S. economy. The model's variables are expressed as log deviations form a non-stochastic steady state.
The U.S. data are also in logs, and both the model data and the actual data have been HP-filtered.
-14-14 See for example King and Rebelo (1999) .
We used Dynare (see Juillard (2003) ) to calculate the model's steady state, to find a first order approximation, and to calculate the moments reported in Table 2 . The second row of the table reports results for our benchmark value of 1/P (0.33), the rows above and below are for the alternative values (1, 0.20 and 0.14), and the bottom row is for the U.S. data. Beginning with the column for y and the second row, 0.014 is the model's standard deviation of output; it is slightly smaller than the standard deviation of output in the data, 0.016. Proceeding to the column for inv, 3.13 is the ratio of the model's standard deviation of investment to the model's standard deviation of output; R was chosen to make it virtually identical to the corresponding ratio in the data, 3.12.
The second number in the cell, 0.99, is the model's correlation between investment and output; it is somewhat higher than the correlation in the data, 0.89. The columns for c, n, inf and w provide the moments for consumption, employment, inflation and the real wage.
The first thing to note in Table 2 is that -with a few exceptions -our rudimentary NNS model comes quite close to matching the moments in the data. The second thing to note is that the value of 1/P has almost no effect on the model's moments. Real Business Cycle models need a very elastic labor supply curve to generate the employment volatility that is observed in the data; 1/P = 4 is not unusual in that literature. 14 Employment and output are demand determined in NNS models, and workers may be off their notional labor supply curves. Thus, we do not need an elastic labor supply to match the volatility of employment; we can let 1/P conform to the empirical estimates. Table 2 does alert us to some potential weaknesses in the model, weaknesses that may play a role in the welfare analysis that follows. Output is slightly less volatile in the model than it is in the data, and the relative volatility of inflation is substantially less than it is in the data. Moreover, -15-inflation and output are negatively correlated in the model, while they are positively correlated in the data; and real wages and output more positively correlated in the model than they are in the data.
All of these facts suggest that the model may be missing some demand side shocks, or that the interest rate and fiscal shocks that have been included may not have been modeled correctly. We will return to this issue later in section 3.3. We also note that the relative volatility of both consumption and employment are somewhat higher in the model than they are in the data; this may lead us to overestimate the costs of nominal inertia. An because the value of 1/P has virtually no effect on any of these moments, this parameter can not be chosen to address any of the model's deficiencies.
The work of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and (especially) Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2002) suggests that we may also be able to test our model against the data in a way that is more directly related to welfare. Economic efficiency requires that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and work be equal to the marginal product of labor (MPN). Figure   1 , which is borrowed from Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido, illustrates this efficiency gap. n1 would be employment under perfect competition, n2 is the flexible wage/price solution, and nt is the solution with nominal inertia. Neglecting constant terms,
gap t = log(MRS t ) -log(MPN t ) = log(C t ) + Plog(N t ) -[log(Y t ) -log(N t )],
The gap can be partitioned into a wage gap, (35) wgap t = log(MRS t ) -log(W t /P t ) = log(C t ) + Plog(N t ) -log(W t /P t ), and a price gap, (36) pgap t = log(W t /P t ) -log(MPN t ) = log(W t /P t ) -[log(Y t ) -log(N t )].
Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido calculate the volatility of these gaps, using U.S. data, and they make -16- 15 The list of state variables depends on the type of nominal inertia present; for notational simplicity, we have suppressed any reference to state variables in the definition of the V function.
inferences about the cost to welfare that this volatility implies. The overall gap is very volatile, and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido claim that the welfare cost of U.S. business cycles is high. Table 3 shows the volatility in these gaps, both in our model and in the U.S. data. The first number in each cell is the standard deviation of the gap; the second number is the correlation between the gap and output. Our NNS model is capable of generating much of the volatility that is observed in the data; the model seems to do better for higher values of 1/P. The wage gap is much more volatile than the price gap, suggesting that it is the major source of the welfare costs, as Gali,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido claim.
Measuring the welfare cost nominal inertia -
Let V t be the value function for aggregate welfare in period t, evaluated at the point where state variables are in their non-stochastic steady state. 15 In light of (31), V t is given by
In this section, we use Dynare to calculate a second order approximation of V t under various assump-tions about nominal inertia and other key parameters in the model. Let V t (", T) represent aggregate utility for an economy with a given type of nominal inertia (characterized by " and T).
The welfare cost of nominal inertia in this economy is
CC t is a cardinal number, and its units are hard to understand. However, following Lucas An implication of Lucas' ingeniously simple calculation is that the welfare cost of nominal inertia -which is after all not the only source of fluctuations in consumption -must be small indeed. We want to argue that our NNS model suggests otherwise.
Our household utility function includes work effort (or leisure), and our model is inherently one of heterogeneous agents. So, it is not obvious how to compare our utility calculations to Lucas'.
However, we have already defined an "average" utility function, (31), and we have assumed a log specification for the utility of consumption. So, our CC t (", T) can be interpreted as the percentage of consumption households would on average be willing to give up to be free of a particular type of nominal inertia, assuming that the work effort is held constant.
To see this, let {C j * } and {AL j * } be consumption and the average disutility of work in the flexible wage/price solution, let {C j } and {AL j } be consumption and the average disutility of work in the solution with nominal inertia, and let > solve:
-18- 16 In fact, in the presence of wage inertia, price inertia appears to be welfare improving. There are a number of distortions in our NNS model. Eliminating just one -price inertia -need not increase welfare.
for our assumed value of $. Our CC t (",T) = 100*>, which expresses the costs as percentages of consumption (instead of fractions). Table 4 presents the consumption cost of our benchmark type of nominal inertia -(", T) = (0.67, 0.75). In our benchmark parameterization -1/P = 0.33 and (D, F) 2 -the cost is 1.03% of consumption; this is twenty times Lucas' upper limit. Recall that 1/P = 0.33 is at the upper end of the range of empirical estimates for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. If we use a value closer to the middle of the estimated range -1/P = 0.14 -the cost of nominal inertia is 2.13% of consumption; if we use a productivity process typical of the RBC literature -(D, F) 3 -the cost rises to 6 or 7% of consumption. These costs would certainly seem to be significant. Table 5 presents the consumption costs of different types of nominal inertia, under the conservative assumption that the Frisch elasticity is 1/P = 0.33. The first row of Table 5 is taken from   Table 4 ; it is the consumption for our benchmark nominal inertia -(", T) = (0.67, 0.75). The second row gives the consumption cost of price inertia -(", T) = (0.67, 0), and the third row gives the consumption cost of wage inertia -(", T) = (0, 0.75). Wage inertia appears to be much more costly than price inertia. 16 This result is consistent with the fact that the volatility of the wage gap in Table   3 is much larger than the volatility of the price gap. Table 6 shows a variance decomposition for the model's shocks -the productivity shock, , p ; the interest rate shock, , i ; and the government spending shock, , g . The productivity shock and the interest rate shock each explain about half of the variation in output, consumption, and investment. The interest rate shock explains most of the variation in employment, and the -19-17 RBC models have the same difficulty; see Fatas and Mihov (2000a, b) .
Which shocks are important in the model? Is something missing? -
productivity shock explains most of the variation in the real wage rate and inflation. Clearly, both of these shocks play a major role in the welfare calculations of the last section. By contrast, the government spending shock explains very little of the variation in any variable of interest.
The impulse response functions in Figure 2 show what a government spending shock does in our model. Output and inflation go up, causing the central bank to raise the nominal and real interest rates, and investment is crowed out. All of this is consistent with the evidence from the VARs found in Blanchard and Perotti (2001) , Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) and elsewhere.
However, consumption is also crowed out in our model, and this is not consistent with the evidence from the VARs.
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In section 3.1, we identified some other ways in which our model did not match the data well: inflation is less volatile in the model than it is in the data; and inflation and output are negatively correlated in the model, while they are positively correlated in the data; moreover, real wages are more positively correlated with output in the model than they are in the data. The impulse response functions in Figure 2 suggest that the government spending shock should help with all of these pro-blems, but the variance decompositions in Table 3 suggest that government spending shocks are not having much effect in our model.
All of these facts suggest that the model may be missing some important demand shocks, or that government spending shocks have not been modeled correctly. In future work, we plan to add savings shocks and/or change the way in which government spending affects aggregate demand.
If for example government spending shocks increased consumption -in line with the VAR evidence -then they might have more effect on inflation and the real wage. We speculate that these -20-improvements in the model will increase the implied welfare cost of nominal inertia.
Conclusion
To be completed. As both n and w are for the nonfarm business sector, we normalize their standard deviations by the standard deviation of real GDP of the nonfarm business sector. 5. Correlations with output are the second number in each cell. Here, we provide derivations for some of the expressions that were asserted in the main text.
A1: The firm's marginal cost (equation (3) in the text) -
Firm f chooses K t-1 (f) and N t (f) to minimize total cost
Ignoring time subscripts and the firm index, the FOC's for this minimization imply
Using this condition in the production function, Y = ZK < N 1-< , it is straight forward to see that
So, total cost can be written as
and marginal cost can be written as equation (3) in the text.
A2: Aggregate output (equations (27) and (28) in the text) -
Using (A1.3), and the demand curves for the firms output (equation (5) in the text) aggregate employment of the labor bundle can be written as
where DP t / I 1 0 (P(f) t /P t ) -Np df. Or equivalently, the aggregate output is
Using (A1.2), the aggregate capital stock can be written as
-28-In light of (A2.3), (A2.2) becomes
which is equation (27) in the text.
Recalling that (1-")" j is the fraction of firms that reset their prices t-j period ago, and have not gotten to reset them since,
which is equation (28) in the text.
A3: Aggregate disutility of work (equations (30) and (31) in the text) -
Recalling that L d t (h) = (W t (h)/W t ) -Nw N t , and that (1-T)T j is the fraction of households that reset their wages t-j period ago, and have not gotten to reset them since,
-Nw(1+P) dh represents wage dispersion (analogous to DP t above), then
So finally, we have equations (30) and (31) Standard errors are in parentheses. Details on all data series are found below.
Productivity: We take the deviation of the log of total factor productivity, z t , from an estimated linear trend and estimate the autoregression, z t = Dz t-1 + , p,t over two sample periods. The first, 1960:1 -2003:2, yields our benchmark parameterization. The second, 1979 The second, :3 -2003 :2, we use for sensitivity analysis. We chose a longer sample to estimate our benchmark processes for productivity because of our concern that shorter samples might be excessively influenced by cyclical factors. The shorter sample, which coincides with the sample used to estimate the interest rate rule, is used for sensitivity analysis because the evidence in Stock and Watson (2002) Government Purchases: As with productivity, we take the deviation of the log of government purchases from an estimated linear trend and estimate the autoregression, g t = . + D g g t-1 + , g,t . Using the same two samples, we obtain, II. Other Parameters ": Firms reset prices each quarter with probability 1-", so that the mean time between price changes is (1-") -1 . Taylor (1999) surveys a large literature and concludes, "price changes and wage changes have about the same average frequency -about one year." This would suggest that we set " = 0.75. His conclusion is consistent with the results reported in Gali and Gertler (1999) and Spordone (2001) . More recently, Begnino and Woodford (2003) state that survey evidence suggests prices are set slightly less frequently than twice a year, which would suggest using a value for " close to 0.5. Bils and Klenow (2002) report evidence that consumer prices are adjusted on average considerably more frequently than once a year. Like Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , we set " = 0.67 so that prices are set on average once each three quarters. This value has the advantage of lying between other values chosen in the literature and is consistent with Blinder's (1994) survey evidence.
T: Workers reset wages each quarter with probability 1-T, so that the mean time between wage changes is (1-T) -1 . We follow the evidence surveyed in Taylor (1999) and set T = 0.75 so that wages are reset annually on average. N p : We set the elasticity of substitution across goods, N p = 7, so that the markup of price over marginal cost, : p = N p /(N p -1) is about 17 percent. Estimates of the markup reported in the literature vary across sectors from about 11 percent to 23 percent. See Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2003) . Although the evidence suggests that the15 percent markup used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) is a reasonable value for the U.S. manufacturing sector, the evidence cited in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti indicates that markups outside of manufacturing are higher. As a result we selected a value in the middle of the range of values in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti. N w : We set the elasticity of substitution across workers, N w = 7, so that the wage markup, : w = N w /(N w -1) is about 17 percent. This is based on evidence on inter-industry wage differentials discussed in Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti (2003) .
<:
We set the capital share to be 0.25. Prices are set so that P = : p MC, and marginal cost can be written as the ratio of wages to the marginal product of labor. Thus P = : 
